人口分布で今35歳が一番多いが、この層はメディア離れが進んでおり、新聞を読まない。彼らにコミュニケーションを通じて情報を届けたいとのこと。「参考」は「35歳」とかけており、またこの発表の日はR25モバイルが終了する日というのも意識していたらしい。（ちなみに今日R25モバイルはYahoo!モバイルで復活するとの情報が。。。）
芸者東京田中さん「僕のところに朝日新聞が来て、朝日新聞終わってるなー、いや、始まってるなーと思った。今僕は新聞読まないんですけど（会場笑）、まず僕らみたいなところと朝日新聞が組んでやるということをご評価いただきたい。それが一番のニュースバリュー。それを評価してください（会場笑）」
Favorite Places 東京編に続き、京都編です！またマイマップの中から少しずつピックアップして、ご紹介していきます。
先日、Google が Favorite Places（わたしの好きな場所） というサービスをローンチしました。
本日、Google マップでは、世界 13 都市において、その土地に詳しいトレンドセッターを 200 名集め、各自のお気に入りの場所を紹介する「わたしの好きな場所」を始めました。対象都市は、ニューヨーク、サンフランシスコ、ロンドン、バンコク、台北、マドリード、パリ、プラハ、モスクワ、クアラルンプール、香港、そして日本からは東京と京都が参加しています。
このキャンペーンは、カスタマイズしたマップを作れる“マイマップ”という機能を利用して展開しています。マイマップを利用すると、位置を示すマークや線、テキスト、写真や動画を埋め込んで自分なりのマップを作成して、世界中の人々と共有することができます。今回は、土地に精通した方や最先端を走る人たちのお気に入りの場所を紹介するマイマップを提供することで、Google マップをもっと楽しく、便利に使っていただければと考えています。
私は現在「旅人」という肩書きでお仕事をさせて頂いており、「旅に関わること」「日本の文化やサービスその他を海外に伝えること」「海外の文化やサービスその他を国内に伝えること」を中心に活動しています。で、本件についても Google さんから旅人向けだよ！とお声がけ頂き、プロジェクトに参加させて頂いておりました :) チームの皆様、ありがとうございました！ NDAはあるのですが、本件についてはブログに書いてもいい。。。というかどんどん書いて！とのことなので、さっそく取り上げたいと思います :)
ブログを書いている人が FriendFeed を始めるべき７つの理由という記事がLifehacking.jpで先日公開されていました。
| from: | 特定ユーザーからのエントリーを検索します。 | from:bret |
| group: | return entries within a specific group | group:movie-reviews |
| friends: | 指定したユーザーの友達全員からのエントリーを検索します。 | friends:jim |
| service: | 特定サービスからのエントリーを検索します。 | service:yelp |
| intitle: | タイトルに特定のキーワードを含むエントリーを検索します。 | intitle:pizza |
| incomment: | コメントに特定のキーワードを含むエントリーを検索します。 | incomment:awesome |
| comment: | 特定ユーザーがコメントを付けたエントリーを検索します。 | comment:paul |
| comments: | 指定した数以上のコメントが付けられているエントリーを検索します。 | comments:10 |
| like: | 特定ユーザーが「お気に入り」マークを付けたエントリーを検索します。 | like:sanjeev |
| likes: | 指定した数以上の「お気に入り」マークが付けられているエントリーを検索します。 | likes:10 |
| - | 検索結果から特定の項目（文字列、ユーザーなど）を除外します。 | jobs -steve |
| , | OR 演算子（いずれかのキーワードを含む検索）を実行します。 | from:paul,bret,jim,sanjeev friendfeed |
ところでふと。これからTwitterを始める人達（含む政治家）に教えてあげたらよい細かいtipsをまとめていくといいかもしれないなと思いました。基本的な使い方について書いている人はたくさんいるので、もっと細かいこと。例えば：
So who thinks they know what the killer app from the semantic web will be???
セマンティックウェブのキラーアプリケーションが何だかわかる人いる？@david_bott Any feedback on my speech? What's the reaction?
@david_bott 僕のスピーチへのフィードバックないの？感想は？I'm interested in hearing from defence tweeters on your views on what's needed now re strategic acquisition reform in defence. What's key?
防衛関係に詳しいTwitterユーザの意見を聞きたいんだけど。防衛関係の戦略的買収改革について今何が鍵だと思う？@wallaceme no. I use my own iPhone on my own account which I pay for. I do all my own tweets. Happy?
@wallaceme いや、僕は自分でiPhoneの料金を自分で支払ってるよ。自分で全てのtweetをしてる。満足？@JULIANBRAY No. I've never claimed a penny in expense/allowances or pay since entering the House of Lords in 2004.
@JULIANBRAY 僕は2004年に貴族院に入って以来費用請求したことなんかないよ。My take on Department of Business, Innovation and Skills announcement here: http://www.dius.gov.uk/
ビジネス・イノベーション・技能省の発表についての僕の見解はこちらを読んでね。
JET fusion reactor is so impressive up close. See photo.http://twitpic.com/5oy7c
JET核融合炉は近くで見るとすごいね。写真はこちら。Very frank discussion with biotech industry & Peter Mandelson. Top issue by far:acute lack of venture capital. Parallels with clean tech.
バイオテクノロジー業界の人達とPeter Mandelson氏とざっくばらんなディスカッションを行ったよ。最重要事項はベンチャーキャピタルの不足だね。クリーンテクノロジーも同様だね。I'm attending launch of digital economy hubs this morning at British Library. Should be interesting.
デジタル経済ハブのローンチイベントに参加してくるよ。多分面白いと思う。
最近AR関連で益々色々出てきましたね！というわけで４つの動画をピックアップ。
３）ARを使ったTwitterアプリ「TwittARound」
カメラとiPhone3GSのコンパス機能を使ってあなたの近くにいるTwitterユーザのtweetを表示してくれるというもの。製作者はMichael Zoellnerさん。 TechCrunchの記事にも。
7/11-7/12に第二回pixivフェスタが開催されたので私も2日目に行ってきました！
What do we want? What does the Islamic Revolution want? You are hearing these from someone [Rafsanjani] who has helped the Revolution even before the time when the Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini] led the Revolution. I am talking about 60 years [of my 75 years of life]. We know what the Imam’s thinking was: He said what I want is what the people want, and we should do our utmost to attract people.
His thinking [not opposing the competition among groups] was the same as the Prophet’s belief that people should participate in the affairs of the state willfully and by their own decision, and it was the Imam’s great accomplishment that he could achieve this [convincing people that they should participate in the affairs of the state]. [Thus,] People became so well informed that the streets that are now full of followers of the Imam could overthrow the arrogant and proud Pahlavi [regime] that was being helped at that time by the reactionary forces both in the East and the West, and because of the high price of oil and the wealth that it had accumulated [it had thought that it could do anything].
The religious basis of Imam’s [thinking] was the idea that an Islamic government cannot be founded without people’s participation, and if people are not satisfied [with the political establishment], the government will not be Islamic.
In appointing [Mahdi] Bazargan as the first prime minister after the revolution, and in the appointment order that I [Rafsanjani] read [at that time], the Imam emphasized that the Revolutionary Council [that had been formed secretly on the order of Ayatollah Khomeini during the Revolution to lead the Revolution and lay the foundation for the post-revolutionary era] should serve only for a short time.
The Constitution must be drafted and ratified quickly, and it [the Constitution] must specify that the basis for everything is people’s vote, from the Supreme Leader who is elected through the people’s vote for the members of the Assembly of Experts [that appoints the Leader], to the president, the Majles [parliament] deputies, city councils, and any other officials; they must all rely on people’s vote.
The Islamic Republic is not just a formality and superficial [to which people responded by chanting slogans in support of Rafsanjani]; it is a reality that has its roots in the Prophet’s thinking. The Islamic and republican aspects must always be together. If any one of them is damaged, the Revolution will be dead. If the system is not Islamic, we will take the wrong path, but if the republicanism does not exist, the government will not be able to achieve any of its goals [and, hence, will have no legitimacy].
"イスラム共和国は形式だけでも表面上のものでもない。預言者の考えに基づく現実だ。イスラム的要素と共和的要素が両方なくてはならない。どちらかが毀損されると革命は死んだも同然だ。体制がイスラムでなければ我々は間違った道を進み、共和制がなければ政府は目的を達成することはできないだろう。"
Rafsanjani was referring to the fact that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was given a free hand in making allegations and accusations against all of his opponents, and was even granted extra rebuttal time on national television on the eve of the election, which was even declared illegal by Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi, the Chief Justice, who is normally an ally of the conservatives.
He then outlined his proposal for getting the country out of what he called a crisis. He made it clear that his proposal is the result of his consultation with the Assembly of Experts, as well as with the Expediency Council (a Constitutional body that arbitrates between the Guardian Council and the Majles, and acts as the consultation organ of the Supreme Leader) and, therefore, has the backing of two powerful organs. He declared that the Guardian Council did not use the five-day extension that the Supreme Leader had granted it [to investigate the fraud in the election] fruitfully.
Rafsanjani氏は更に、イランがこの危機を乗り越えるための提案の骨子を挙げた。なお、この提案は専門家会議と最高評議会と話し合った結果であることを明らかにした。護憲評議会が不正調査を5日間延長するという最高指導者の決定を有効に使わなかったと言う。
His proposal contained the following elements:
- The government should act in a way that people’s trust in it, which has been destroyed, is restored [he did not, however, specify how].
- Everyone and every organ, whether it is the political establishment, or the government, the Majles, the security forces, or the protesters, should act lawfully. Even those who are not happy with the present laws must try [peacefully] to modify the laws.
- An environment must be created in which all sides can express their opinion peacefully and without fighting or fear [hence, supporting peaceful demonstrations]. The means of mass communication, especially the Voice and Visage, should act effectively for achieving this goal.
- All the political prisoners must be released immediately. “We should not allow our enemies to laugh at us and plot against us, because we have imprisoned some people. We need to tolerate each other,” he said.
- Those who have been hurt by recent events must be compensated. “We need to express our heart-felt and sincere sorrow for what has happened to them.”
- Independent means of mass communication (the press and other means) must be allowed to operate legally and within the framework of law. Their rights must not be limited, and the political establishment must not ignore their lawful rights.
- 政府は人々の信頼を得るようにふるまう必要がある
- 全ての人、全ての組織が法を守る必要がある。それが政治組織であれ政府であれ議会であれ治安部隊であれ抗議者であれ。今の法律に不満があるのなら、平和的に法を改正するよう努力すべきである。
- 誰もが平和的に意見を表明できる環境を作る必要がある。そのためにはマスコミ（特にVoice and Visage）は役割を果たすべき。
- 政治犯として拘束されている人達を全員すぐに釈放するべき。敵に笑われるような行いをすべきでないしそれが敵の策略を生む。お互いに我慢が必要だ。
- 最近の事件で負傷した人が賠償を受けられるようにしなければならない。彼らの身に起こったことに対して、心から悲しみを表すべきだ。
- マスコミは合法的に運営されるべき。彼らの権利は制限されるべきではないし、政治体制側は彼らの権利を無視してはならない。
Also, by reminding the hard-liners that when people did not want Imam Ali to govern them after the Prophet, he stayed home for 19 years and did not intervene in politics, he implicitly told Ayatollah Khamenei (without naming him) that, “If people do not want you, leave them alone.” This is particularly important in the view of the fact that the hard-liners refer to Ayatollah Khamenei as “the era’s Ali,” meaning that he acts according to Imam Ali’s teachings and life.
In a statement released today, Sayed Mohammad Khatami said that he was unable to join Friday Prayer’s because he “was in Qom holding meetings with prominent clerics.” From the onset of the post-election turmoil, several leaders of the opposition have gone to Qom and held meetings with Ayatollahs. Many Ayatollahs have so far pledged their support for the cause of the protesters.
Etemaade Melli Newspaper reported that the Minister of Information, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejaie, held a meeting with Sayed Mohammad Khatami. It is important to note that Ejaie is widely touted as the “Intelligence Chief” of Iran. It is not clear what was discussed in the meeting at this point.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi – a hard-line member of the Assembly of Experts and the spiritual advisor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – has strongly criticized Rafsanjani’s Friday Sermon. He said that, “A government’s legitimacy doesn’t come from people, but by God’s support.” He claimed that Rafsanjani had “no right” to ask for the release of detainees. He pointed out that Prophet Mohammed had also ordered the destruction of mosques built by Monafiqeen (People who claimed to be Muslim so they could create rifts between the Islamic communities).
政府側はデモは全て叩き潰す( "any demonstrations would be mercilessly crushed" )と明言し実行。治安部隊だらけで軍の演習のような状態だった。人々は殴られ、逮捕されて拷問を受ける危険性を省みず集まった。世界に向けて、まだ暴力的で正当ではない政府が存在しているということ、そして自分たちがまだ戦っているのだということを知らせたかったからだという。
7月9日は1999年に行われたテヘラン大学の学生たちによる学生運動 18 Tir の10周年。1979年の体制確立以来最大の反体制運動だった。イランでは砂嵐が吹き荒れたため、大学や企業などは閉鎖され、町を去るように推奨された。テキストメッセージシステムは不通に。テヘラン市長のMorteza Tamadon氏は治安部隊により叩き潰されると発言。しかしデモは行われた。初期の頃と比べて人数は減り、マークされやすいカメラつき携帯電話や旗は持たず、しかしそれまで以上の勇気が必要とされるデモだった。「独裁者に死を」「Ahmadiは恥を知り、我々の国から手を離せ」「恐れるな。みんな一緒だ。」テヘランでは催涙ガスが使われ、警察が空に向かって銃を撃ち、Basijは改革派に賛同してクラクションを鳴らした車のナンバープレートを記録したり車を殴りつけたりした。
デモに参加しなくなった人々も黙っていたわけではない。毎夜屋根から"Allah Akbar"（神は偉大だ）と声をあげ、Mousavi氏に小切手を切り、政府の銀行や国営テレビで宣伝される商品のボイコットをし、同じ時間に電子機器をつけて電力をオーバーロードさせようとしている。Mousavi氏はKhatami氏やKarroubi氏と共に公安の弾圧をやめ、逮捕者を釈放するよう合同声明を発表した。
Although Iran’s elections are not free by Western standards, the Islamic Republic has a 30-year history of highly contested and competitive elections at the presidential, parliamentary and local levels. Manipulation has always been there, as it is in many other countries.
More fundamentally, American “Iran experts” consistently underestimated Ahmadinejad’s base of support.
Polling in Iran is notoriously difficult; most polls there are less than fully professional and, hence, produce results of questionable validity. But the one poll conducted before Friday’s election by a Western organization that was transparent about its methodology — a telephone poll carried out by the Washington-based Terror-Free Tomorrow from May 11 to 20 — found Ahmadinejad running 20 points ahead of Mousavi. This poll was conducted before the televised debates in which, as noted above, Ahmadinejad was perceived to have done well while Mousavi did poorly.
Perhaps more threatening to the supreme leader, the committee called on other clerics to join the fight against the government’s refusal to adequately reconsider the charges of voter fraud. The committee invoked powerful imagery, comparing the 20 protesters killed during demonstrations with the martyrs who died in the early days of the revolution and the war with Iraq, asking other clerics to save what it called “the dignity that was earned with the blood of tens of thousands of martyrs.”
若者を中心とする大胆な抗議行動は、イランの選挙戦で今回初めて導入された候補者総当たりのテレビ討論がもたらした副産物とも言える。約7000万人の人口のうち「4000万～5000万人が見た」（地元メディア）と言われるほどの驚異的な高視聴率を記録した生番組では、言いたい放題の中傷合戦が繰り広げられた。
相手を「うそつき」と呼び、政界重鎮（Rafsanjani氏）の「金権腐敗」が名指しで暴露された。国民の間でうわさやブラックジョークの対象でしかなかった体制のタブーにも触れた。「何でも言える」雰囲気を醸成し、言論統制などで封じ込められていた「パンドラの箱」を開け放った。
Ahmadinejad氏の支持層は地方の貧しい人々。それまでの政府には見捨てられていたと感じていた層に対して、石油の利益を人々に分配すると約束した。その結果ひどいインフレが発生したが、Ahmadinejad大統領はインフレは食料や燃油の価格が世界的に上がっているせいだとしている。
「現政権は（1978年の）革命以来、最悪の政権だ」と、アリは言う。「この4年間、アハマディネジャドは世界におけるイランのイメージをぶち壊し、経済も破壊した」年配の人たちはイラン・イラク戦争（80～88年）の厳しい時代に首相を務めたムサビを覚えている。彼らの多くは再び戦争が勃発すれば、国を守るために戦う立場にいる。
現金をばらまくアハマディネジャドの政治手法と世界的な経済危機があいまって、イランは過去1年間で前例がないほどのインフレに陥った。だが政府のインフレ対策といえば、政府職員の給与を引き上げ、大統領の演説に集まった人々にカネを配ることくらい。アリに言わせれば、国民をホームレスのように扱い、カネを配る手法こそ、アハマディジャドの経済政策の最大の問題だ。
ただし、アリがアハマディネジャドに投票しない最大の理由は経済ではない。「正直言うと、気が変わったのは2週間前。アハマディネジャドがムサビを、イマーム・フセインの敵に例えたことが原因だ」イマーム・フセインは預言者ムハンマドの孫で、彼がスンニ派のカリフ、ヤジドの軍に殺害された事件は、シーア派の教義の中核をなしている。アハマディネジャドは大統領選の演説で、ヤジドがイマーム・フセインを殺害したように、ムサビのような旧体制の人間が自分を追い落とそうとしていると訴えた。「イマーム・フセインを殉教死させたように、私たちを抹殺することはできない」と、アハマディネジャドは2週間前、テヘランで開かれた宗教集会で語った。「自分をイマーム・フセインになぞらえるとは、いい度胸だ」と、アリは言う。「しかも、イラクとの戦時中に首相を務め、ホメイニ師の盟友だったムサビをヤジドに例えるとは。これは国民に対する欺瞞だ」
アリは今や、アハマディネジャド政権の４年間すべてに疑問を感じている。「われわれは（国会議長のアリ・）ラリジャニから、世界との無用な衝突を避けるためにホロコーストについての発言は控えるよう言われている。なのにアハマディネジャドは、ジュネーブでまたその話題に触れた」昨年４月、アハマディネジャドが国連の世界人種差別撤廃会議の席でホロコーストを疑問視する発言をすると、欧米諸国の多くの代表が席を立った。「敵がイランを攻撃する口実を探している最中に、アハマディネジャドは理由もなくイランへの反感をかき立てている」と、アリは言う。「祖国に論理と知性を取り戻す大統領が必要だ。だから、私はムサビに投票する」
'This Iranian Form of Theocracy Has Failed'
Almost all my friends, 95 percent of them, are now in prison; and I am barely able to contact my family, the phones are almost dead.
SPIEGEL: Obama compared Ahmadinejad and Mousavi and commented that the difference between the candidates is only minor. Is he correct?
Kadivar: This is correct, but then again, it is not correct. The differences regarding the nuclear question and the evaluation of Israeli politics are indeed minor. As for the right to uranium enrichment, you won't find an Iranian politician who thinks differently. But on the question of democracy, the differences are formidable. Ahmadinejad takes an aggressive position, while Mousavi emphazises the adherence to laws and the constitution. I believe that the issue of democratization is presently the central problem. Everything else, including the nuclear question, is secondary.
Query: "What is the ruling regarding holders of government positions, whom shari'a law requires to act justly, honestly, and wisely... if they [do not fulfill] these requirements to any degree, but behave in a manner diametrically opposed to them?"
Reply: "If none of the requirements mentioned in this query are met, this automatically, and without any need for impeachment, brings about the de facto collapse of the velayat [the 'jurisprudent,' meaning Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei] and of the government that is in charge of administering social affairs [i.e. the government of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] - and renders null and void all decrees issued by those who hold government positions...
"In the event of a breach of any article of the contract between the two sides - namely [the contract] between the position holder and the people, who appointed him - the people may remove the position holder from his post."
Query: "What is the religious duty of the people if these position holders insist on acting in ways that contravene the religious directive of 'commanding good and prohibiting evil?'"
Reply: "As I said, both religious law and common sense [dictate that] position holders who have lost the right to administer social affairs automatically lose their posts, and their rule is no longer legitimate in any way. If they remain in their position by means of force, fraud, or forgery, then the people must express their opinion regarding the illegitimacy and unpopularity [of these position holders], and remove them from their posts in the least harmful way...
"Obviously, this is a duty incumbent upon all [and not only upon specific individuals]... and none may evade it under any pretext. The elite [i.e. the clerics] have a special obligation [to carry out this task], since they are knowledgeable in religious and civil law, and have greater ability than [the rest of the people]. Their statements have greater influence and carry greater force; therefore, they bear a greater responsibility. They must present [the people]... with an alternative [option], while [preserving the people's] unity and ideological harmony, and establishing parties as well as public and private organizations."
After weeks of silence, Iran's mainstream clerics, perhaps the most powerful constituency inside Iran, have spoken out. In a bold statement Saturday, the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qom called President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reelection illegitimate. The Guardian Council that oversaw the election, the association concluded, no longer had the "right to judge in this case as some of its members have lost their impartial image in the eyes of the public."
As stunning as it might seem to hear clerics openly condemn an election that the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has sanctified, inside Iran it is less unexpected. Most clerics in the holy Shiite city of Qom have never supported the extremist religious and political ideas of Khamenei and the hard-liners within his inner circle. The clerics in this association -- and many other high-ranking ayatollahs -- had already individually sided with the opposition now led by Mir Hossein Mousavi. They have done so not to bolster the so-called "green revolution" of the streets, but to save the Islamic republic from extinction.
The likely beneficiary of this religious struggle is Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. If the statement from the association in Qom is a clue, then the former president, who has been lobbying behind the scenes in Qom for weeks, has used his time well. A skilled political operative once known as "the Shark," he has been doing what he does best: leaving no fingerprints. He appears one day to be retreating back into the fold of the hard-line regime and on another siding with the opposition. At this point, it is unclear where he stands, which is precisely the place he prefers to be, as long as other heavyweights, such as the members of the Qom clerical association, do his bidding for him.
When the dust settles, Iran could turn out to be a gentler Islamic republic. With leading reformers in jail and the street tamed, the voices for radical change are falling silent. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, could be dwarfed by Rafsanjani and the mainstream clerical establishment, which may not be particularly fond of Rafsanjani, but think he is a better alternative for preserving the Islamic system. Meanwhile, to ensure that system remains intact, Rafsanjani might well turn a blind eye to the trial and imprisonment of the reformers he so fiercely defended and claimed as his allies over the last several months. It wouldn't be the first time he has sold them out.
The semiofficial Iranian Labor News Agency reported Sunday that Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani will deliver the nation's weekly keynote religious sermon. Rafsanjani, who chairs powerful boards that oversee the office of the supreme leader and adjudicate disputes between government bodies, is the highest-profile backer of opposition candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who lost to Ahmadinejad in an election marred by allegations of vote-rigging.
police broke locks and then bones as they rampaged through the dormitories, attacked dozens of students, carted off more than 100 and killed five. The authorities still deny the incursion took place. But the account pieced together from interviews with five of those present tells a different story.
"We were getting ready to go to sleep when we suddenly heard them breaking the locks to enter our rooms," said one of the 133 students arrested that night. "I'd seen them earlier beating students but I didn't imagine that they would come inside. It's even against Iranian law."
Forty-six students from one dorm were arrested and taken to the basement of the interior ministry on nearby Fatemi Street. It was there, on the building's upper floors, that the vote-counting and – claim opposition supporters – the rigging, was going on. Another 87 were taken to a security police building on Hafez Street. Students spoke of torture and mistreatment.
Witnesses said the two women and three men were repeatedly beaten on the head with electric batons. Their families were warned not to talk about their children or hold funerals – like the parents of Neda Soltan, whose face became synonymous with the protest movement after she was filmed being shot dead in the street.
Under Iranian law, police, revolutionary guards and other militia are not allowed to enter universities – a legacy of the 1999 student riots. Until last month those riots were the most serious unrest the country had seen since the Islamic revolution.
Foremost among those leading Iran's stiletto revolution is Zahra Rahnavard, a prominent Iranian politics professor and the wife of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the defeated presidential candidate who is bitterly contesting the result of Iran's presidential elections, which saw President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad elected to serve a second four-year term.
During the election campaign, Ms Rahnavard frequently campaigned alongside her husband – an unprecedented double act in Iranian politics – criticising the government for its catastrophic handling of the Iranian economy and the uncompromising social policies implemented by Mr Ahmadinejad during his presidency, particularly concerning the role of women.
夫Mousavi氏が革命防衛隊やBasijから身を隠さざるをえなくなったときも、Rahnavard氏は抗議活動を訴え続けた。治安部隊の暴行にも負けず抗議者たちが抗議を続けることができたのはRahnavard氏の力によるものとこの記事では分析している。
And she has maintained her public profile throughout the turmoil that has gripped Iran after opposition leaders accused the government of rigging the vote in Mr Ahmadinejad's favour. While her husband has been forced into hiding to escape the attention of the Revolutionary Guards and their Basij militia allies, Ms Rahnavard has continued to call on Iranians to defend their right to protest.
It is largely due to Ms Rahnavard's intervention that the protesters have continued their campaign for electoral justice in the face of the increasingly desperate and cruel measures adopted by the regime's security forces. Despite the government's nationwide ban on all media coverage of the protests, the demonstrators are still managing to provide vivid details of the regime's brutal treatment of the demonstrators. Reports on the social network site, Twitter, claimed that in central Tehran Basij militiamen were using axes and "chopping people like meat – blood everywhere".
また、上記Rafsanjani氏の説明のところで書いた「逮捕された親族」の一人がFaezeh Hashemi氏で、Rafsanjani氏の娘である。
The Iranian MP Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has also made an important contribution to the pro-reform campaign. Ms Hashemi was briefly detained by Iran's security forces after she was shown on television addressing a crowd of Mr Mousavi's supporters.
And yet, for all the efforts of these prominent women to inspire Iran's stiletto pro-reform movement, the longer the country's political crisis drags on, the more it appears the regime is gaining the upper hand.
This is mainly because the pro-reform protesters, who are trying to conduct themselves in a peaceful manner, are no match for the estimated half-a-million security personnel that the regime can call upon to defend itself.
At the forefront of the Islamic regime's attempts to suppress the opposition are the Revolutionary Guards, the elite paramilitary organisation established in 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic revolution's founding father.
革命防衛軍は核開発を含む軍備だけでなく、銀行・石油・天然ガスを始めとする産業を含むイラン経済の50％を握っているという。
Today the Guards, who are charged under the Iranian constitution with protecting the principles of Khomeini's revolution, comprise an estimated 125,000 men who exert so much power and influence throughout the country that they virtually constitute a state within a state.
Apart from controlling key areas of the military establishment – including Iran's controversial nuclear programme – it is estimated the Guards run fifty per cent of the Iranian economy, including banks, oil and gas fields and a number of key industries.
In addition they can call upon the services of the Basij, volunteer militiamen who are dedicated to safeguarding Khomeini's revolutionary legacy. Then there are the armed forces and police, whose leadership has been purged to the extent that the regime can count on their total and unequivocal support.
改革派にとってもう一つ難しいのは、体制を変えようと思っても彼ら自身がイラン・イスラム革命の支持者だったという事実だ。Mousavi氏は1980年代に首相を務め、Rafsanjani氏は2期大統領を務め、体制に忠実に勤めてきた。彼らはイスラム体制の骨組みはそのままに、運用を修正する程度で留めたいのではないか。Mousavi氏とRafsanjani氏は共に自らを穏健派と考え、国際社会との関係（特に核問題）を修復しイランの経済を立て直したいと考えているだろう。
The other fundamental reason that the pro-reform movement is so handicapped in its attempts to change the way the country is governed is that its leaders are themselves dedicated supporters of the Islamic revolution.
Both Mr Mousavi, who served as Iran's prime minister during the 1980s, and Mr Rafsanjani, who served two terms as Iran's president from 1989-97, have proved their credentials as regime loyalists. Rather than seeking to overthrow Iran's fundamentalist system of Islamic government, all they are seeking is a modification in the way the system is run. Both men believe they have been sidelined under Mr Ahmadinejad's presidency, which has seen the hardline conservatives around Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's supreme leader, gain the ascendancy.
Mr Mousavi and Mr Rafsanjani, on the other hand, see themselves as moderates who, were they to return to positions of influence, would improve Iran's economic fortunes and attempt to repair Tehran's relations with the outside world, particularly over the nuclear issue.
色々な意味で現在のイランの政情は冷戦時代のソ連でのイデオロギー上の論争に似ており、体制崩壊をもたらすような蜂起とは別物と考えた方がよいだろう。そうはいっても何万人もの高水準の教育を受けた中流階級の若者たちが大きな変革を求めていることはこの数週間でみてきた。
In many respects, then, the political unrest now taking place in Iran is equivalent to the ideological squabbles that took place in Soviet Union's politburo during the Cold War, rather than the type of popular uprising that would ultimately result in the regime's collapse.
That said, one of the more encouraging developments of the past two weeks has been the appearance of tens of thousands of well-educated, middle class young Iranians who are desperate for a dramatic change in the way their country is run.
イランのインターネット世代はKhomeini師以来の抑圧と権威主義しか知らない。しかしいつの日かイランに自由がもたらされる日が来るだろう。
Iran's internet generation has grown up knowing nothing but the repression and authoritarianism of Khomeini's legacy. And even though the uncompromising tactics employed by the regime's hardliners have succeeded in driving large numbers of the protesters underground, many young Iranians will take comfort from the old Persian saying, that the embers are burning under the ashes.
No matter how hard the regime attempts to reassert its authority, for millions of Iranians the pro-reform genie in Iran is already out of its bottle, and they have no desire for it to be put back.
And whether it is this year or next, the day will surely come that the death of Iran's Angel of Freedom will be avenged.
In 2001, Ali Afshari was arrested for his work as a student leader. He said he was held in solitary confinement for 335 days and resisted confessing for the first two months. But after two mock executions and a five-day stretch where his interrogators would not let him sleep, he said he eventually caved in.
“They tortured me, some beatings, sleep deprivation, insults, psychological torture, standing me for several hours in front of a wall, keeping me in solitary confinement for one year,” Mr. Afshari said in an interview from his home in Washington. “They eventually broke my resistance.”
The problem, he said, was that he was not sure what he was supposed to confess to. So over the next several months, he said, he and his interrogators “negotiated” what he would say — and, more ominously, whom he would implicate. Once his confession was complete, he said, he practiced it for 7 to 10 days, and then it ran on state-run television.
Asia Pacific Internet Research Alliance (APIRA)主催によるAPIRA International conference2009にて基調講演をやらせて頂くことになりました。8/6-7に香港で開催予定です。推薦してくださった御手洗さんありがとうございます♪
